State v. Gomez Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43688 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-9-2016
State v. Gomez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43688
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Gomez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43688" (2016). Not Reported. 2901.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2901
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 




























BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
________________________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
________________________ 
 





LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. O. Box 83720 






JENNY C. SWINFORD 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. O. Box 2816 















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. iii 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1 
 
 Nature Of The Case ............................................................................................. 1 
 
 Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................................... 1 
 
ISSUES ........................................................................................................................... 4 
 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 5 
 
 I. Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial 
  Supports The Jury’s Conclusion That Gomez Was 
  Guilty Of Possession Of Methamphetamine .............................................. 5 
 
  A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 5 
 
  B. Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 5 
 
  C. Gomez’s Conviction Is Supported By Substantial 
   Evidence ......................................................................................... 6 
 
 II. Gomez Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In His 
  Unpreserved Claim That The District Court Erred By Not 
  Giving A Specific Unanimity Instruction ..................................................... 9 
 
  A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 9 
 
  B. Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 9 
 
  C. Gomez Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error 
   In The District Court’s Not Giving An Unrequested 
   Specific Unanimity Instruction ....................................................... 10 
 
   1. Both Gomez’s Possession Of The 
    Methamphetamine Residue Found On His 
    Pipe And The Baggies Of Methamphetamine 
    He Was Transporting With His Co-Defendant 
    Were Part Of The Same Criminal Incident ......................... 12 
ii 
   2. Gomez’s Possession Of Methamphetamine, 
    Based On His Smoking Methamphetamine 
    Earlier, Arose From A Separate Criminal 
    Incident ............................................................................... 13 
 
 III. Gomez Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
  Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence That 
  Gomez Was Transporting A Backpack Filled With 
  Marijuana ................................................................................................. 16 
 
  A. Introduction ................................................................................... 16 
 
  B. Standard Of Review ...................................................................... 16 
 
  C. Under The Circumstances Of This Case, 
   Evidence That Gomez Was Transporting 
   Marijuana With His Co-Defendant Was 
   Part Of The Entire Picture Of Gomez’s 
   Crime Of Possession Of Methamphetamine ................................. 17 
 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 19 
 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 111 P.3d 144 (2005) .................................................. 10 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 272 P.3d 417 (2012) ................................................ 11 
State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 878 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994) .......................... 17, 18 
State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 117 (1999) ....................................................... 6 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 3 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2000) ......................................... 10 
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 261 P.3d 853 (2011) ............................................... 9, 10 
State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 889 P.2d 729 (Ct. App. 1994) ...................................... 6 
State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 956 P.2d 1311 (Ct. App. 1998) ................................ 18 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009) ...................................................... 16 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000) ................................................. 9 
State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975) ....................................................... 17 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 89 P.3d 881 (Ct. App. 2003) .......................................... 11 
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 955 P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1997) ..................................... 5, 7 
State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 231 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2010) .................................... 6, 7 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ......................................... 10, 11, 18 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................................ 5 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009)............................................... 11 
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 247 P.3d 582 (2010) ................................. 9, 11, 17 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) ................................................. 10 




I.C. § 37-2732 ........................................................................................................... 6, 13 
RULES 
I.C.R. 30(b) .................................................................................................................... 10 
I.C.R. 31(a) .................................................................................................................... 11 
I.R.E. 404(b) .................................................................................................................. 17 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 






STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Andrew Scott Gomez appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine.  On appeal, he argues that the state presented insufficient evidence 
to support his conviction; that the district court erred by not giving a specific unanimity 
instruction which was never requested; and that the district court abused its discretion 
by admitting evidence of a backpack filled with marijuana, which Gomez had picked-up 
and was transporting along with his co-defendant. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
While on patrol at around 2:30 a.m. on April 27, 2015, Officer McCarthy saw 
Gomez and his co-defendant, Ms. Thompson, parked behind businesses off of Fairview 
Avenue in Boise.  (Trial Tr., p.83, L.13 – p.86, L.13.)  The area was secluded from the 
public without access to residential areas or businesses, and there was no reason for 
someone to be back there at 2:30 in the morning.  (Id., p.84, Ls.1-13.)  Officer McCarthy 
made contact with the driver, later identified as Gomez, and his co-defendant, asking 
them why they were parked back there.  (Id., p.88, Ls.18-21.)  Both were very nervous, 
and their responses did not make sense.  (Id., p.93, L.6 – p.94, L.14.)  Dissatisfied with 
their self-conflicting responses, both that they were going to see a friend and then that 
the friend was coming to see them, Officer McCarthy had Gomez exit the vehicle and 
questioned him and his co-defendant separately.  (Id., p.88, L.22 – p.91, L.3.)   
Meanwhile, a drug dog had arrived on scene and positively alerted to Gomez’s 
car.  (Id., p.111, L.9 – p.113, L.9.)  A search of the vehicle revealed baggies of 
methamphetamine in a makeup bag on the passenger floor board, in an eyeglass case 
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in Ms. Thompson’s bra, and a separate baggie in her bra; a digital scale; loose 
oxycodone pills; and a backpack containing marijuana in the vehicle’s trunk.  (Id., p.101, 
L.21 – p.102, L.5; p.114, L.2 – p.115, L.18; p.122, L.2 – p.123, L.6; p.128, L.25 – p.129, 
L.14; p.135, Ls.2-7.)  Officers recovered more than 20 grams of methamphetamine at 
the scene; considerably more than a user amount.  (Id., p.143, L.21 – p.144, L.13; 
p.177, L.13 – p.180, L.11.) 
Speaking only with Gomez, Officer McCarthy learned that Gomez was driving 
Ms. Thompson around to run her errands.  (Id., p.91, Ls.4-9; p.102, Ls.21-22.)  After 
confronting him with all the drugs they had found, Gomez initially claimed that he knew 
nothing about the drugs found in the car.  (Id., p.144, L.24 – p.145, L.12.)  But he also 
admitted that he was aware that his co-defendant possessed methamphetamine (id., 
p.148, L.13 – p.149, L.7); that he had smoked methamphetamine earlier with his co-
defendant (id., p.146, L.19 – p.147, L.2); and that he agreed to drive his co-defendant 
around to pick up her things in exchange for some methamphetamine (id., p.146, Ls.1-
18).  Following his arrest and transport to the county jail, after being informed that he 
would be searched and that any contraband he brought into the jail could be used as 
the basis for additional charges, Gomez admitted that he had a pipe, which he earlier 
used to smoke methamphetamine, in his underwear.  (Id., p.149, L.18 – p.154, L.20.)  
The pipe contained residue which later tested positive for methamphetamine.  (Id., 
p.154, Ls.8-15; p.186, L.19 – p.187, L.3.) 
The state charged Gomez with possession of methamphetamine and possession 
of paraphernalia, with a persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp.23-24, 28-29.)  
Gomez filed a motion to suppress both the evidence seized during the encounter with 
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police and his various inculpatory statements, on the theory that police lacked 
reasonable suspicion to detain Gomez.  (R., pp.58-64.)  The district court denied 
Gomez’s suppression motion.  (R., pp.84-88.) 
Meanwhile, the state filed a motion in limine asking for a pretrial ruling on the 
admissibility of Gomez’s admission that on the day he was arrested, prior to his contact 
with police, he had used his pipe to smoke methamphetamine, and on other evidence 
indicative of Gomez’s knowledge of the presence of methamphetamine in the vehicle he 
was driving.  (R., pp.39-44.)  The district court granted the motion in limine.  (8/31/2016 
Tr., p.43, L.22 – p.44, L.12.)  The state also provided notice of its intention to introduce 
what it classified as 404(b) evidence against the defendant; specifically, evidence of the 
marijuana found in the backpack and the defendant’s statements with regards thereto.  
(R., pp.78-79.)  The district court ultimately concluded that the evidence was admissible.  
(Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.11-20.) 
The case went to trial.  (R., pp.92-96; Trial Tr.)  Following the trial, the jury found 
Gomez guilty of both possession of methamphetamine and possession of 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.116-17.)  The district court entered judgment against Gomez and 
sentenced him to a unified term of ten years with two years fixed on the possession of 
methamphetamine, and a concurrent sentence of six months on the possession of 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.120-22.)  Gomez filed a motion for reconsideration (R., p.125), 
which the district court denied (R., pp.132-33).  Gomez also filed a notice of appeal 





Gomez states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt Mr. Gomez’s constructive possession of Ms. 
Thompson’s methamphetamine? 
 
2. Did the district court err when it failed to give a unanimity instruction 
for the possession of methamphetamine charge? 
 
3. Did the district court err when it admitted evidence of the backpack 
of marijuana? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomez was guilty of possession of 
methamphetamine? 
 
2. Has Gomez failed to show that the district court committed fundamental error by 
not giving a specific unanimity instruction, which Gomez never requested below? 
 
3. Has Gomez failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 






Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Jury’s Conclusion That 
Gomez Was Guilty Of Possession Of Methamphetamine 
 
A. Introduction 
The state charged Gomez with, inter alia, possession of methamphetamine.  (R., 
pp.23-24.)  At the conclusion of his trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge.  
(R., p.117.)  On appeal, Gomez argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to 
convict him of possession of methamphetamine.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-12.)  Review of 
the trial record, however, demonstrates that the jury’s verdict is supported by competent 
evidence presented at trial. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992).  In conducting this review, the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.  Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607.  The facts, and inferences to be 
drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the verdict.  Id.  In 
determining whether sufficient evidence to support a conviction was presented at trial, 
the Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury without regard to 
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its ultimate admissibility.  State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 
C. Gomez’s Conviction Is Supported By Substantial Evidence 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) makes it a crime to possess any amount of a controlled 
substance, such as methamphetamine.  “Possession of a controlled substance may be 
actual or constructive.”  State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706, 889 P.2d 729, 735 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  Constructive possession is shown where the defendant has knowledge of 
the controlled substance and the power and intent to control it.  State v. Blake, 133 
Idaho 237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122 (1999).  “Constructive possession may be joint or 
exclusive.”  Id.  The state presented sufficient evidence whereby the jury could conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomez possessed methamphetamine under either 
theory, whether actual or constructive. 
First, the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Gomez had 
actual possession of the methamphetamine residue on his pipe.  When he was 
transported to jail, Gomez was asked if he had any contraband and informed that he 
would be searched, and if anything illegal was found on his person, it would result in 
additional criminal charges.  (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.5-14.)  Gomez then admitted that he 
had a meth pipe in his underwear.  (Id., p.150, Ls.14-16.)  The pipe was removed.  (Id., 
p.150, Ls.22-24.)  Gomez admitted that he used the pipe to smoke methamphetamine.  
(Id., p.154, Ls.6-20; see also State’s Ex. 2 at 35:15 – 35:50.)  Residue collected from 
the pipe tested positive for methamphetamine.  (Trial Tr., p.186, L.19 – p.187, L.3.) 
Gomez’s admission that he used the pipe to consume methamphetamine is 
sufficient evidence to show that Gomez knew the residue was methamphetamine.  
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Gomez’s having the residue-containing pipe in his underwear is sufficient evidence to 
show that Gomez had control over it.  Therefore, there was sufficient evidence whereby 
the jury could convict Gomez of possession of methamphetamine based on the residue 
found on the glass pipe.1 
Second, the state presented sufficient evidence whereby a jury could find that 
Gomez actually possessed the methamphetamine found in his co-defendant’s bra.  
During their search of the suspects and vehicle, officers located a baggie of 
methamphetamine and/or an eyeglass case containing a baggie of methamphetamine 
in Gomez’s co-defendant’s bra.  (Id., p.122, L.10 – p.123, L.6.)  Though Gomez denied 
any knowledge of the drugs found on his co-defendant’s person, evidence was 
presented that his co-defendant claimed that Gomez had in fact shoved the 
methamphetamine down her bra in order to avoid criminal detection.2  (State’s Ex. 2 at 
24:05 – 24:12.) 
As noted above, the question of credibility is an issue for the trier of fact.  Miller, 
131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607.  Construing the statements in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, this is sufficient evidence to show that Gomez had control over 
                                            
1  On appeal, Gomez never appears to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he 
possessed methamphetamine residue in his glass pipe.  By itself, that is sufficient to 
sustain his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. 
 
2  In a footnote, Gomez argues that his co-defendant’s statements to police, placed 
before the jury in an audio recording admitted at trial, were hearsay and that, in any 
case, the state did not rely on them for its theory of the case.  (Appellant’s brief, p.11, 
n.4.)  Neither assertion is relevant under the correct standard of review.  First, as noted 
above, at issue is what the evidence supports, Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607, not the state’s theory of the evidence.  Second, when determining the sufficiency of 
the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury 
without regard to its ultimate admissibility.  Moore, 148 Idaho at 894, 231 P.3d at 539.  
Finally, the audio recording’s admissibility was not objected to at trial (Trial Tr., p.91, 
L.25 – p.92, L.22), nor has it been challenged on appeal. 
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the methamphetamine found in Ms. Thompson’s bra.  The jury could also infer a guilty 
conscience from Gomez’s actions trying to dispose of the contraband, showing that he 
knew what he had placed in Ms. Thompson’s bra.  Thus, there was sufficient evidence 
presented whereby the jury could convict Gomez of possession of methamphetamine 
based on the drugs found in Ms. Thompson’s bra. 
Third, the state presented sufficient evidence to show that Gomez had 
constructive possession of the other packages of methamphetamine found during the 
search of his car.  While being questioned by police, Gomez admitted that he was 
transporting his co-defendant and her drugs in exchange for methamphetamine.  (Trial 
Tr., p.146, Ls.7-18; see also State’s Ex. 2 at 18:00 – 19:25.)  Gomez also told officers 
that he was aware that his co-defendant possessed methamphetamine.  (Trial Tr., 
p.148, L.17 – p.149, L.7; see also State’s Ex. 2 at 26:50 – 28:25.)  Gomez’s knowledge 
that his co-defendant possessed a quantity of methamphetamine, along with his plan to 
get paid in some portion of the drugs, is sufficient evidence whereby the jury could infer 
that Gomez knew methamphetamine was present.  Gomez’s driving of the vehicle in 
order to transport the methamphetamine he knew was present shows his control over 
the drugs.  Alternatively, his belief he would be paid with a portion of the drugs shows 
his intent to control at least that portion of the methamphetamine.  Either way, sufficient 
evidence was presented whereby the jury could convict Gomez of constructive 
possession of methamphetamine based on the other packages of methamphetamine 
found during the search of his car. 
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Under any proper theory of this case,3 the state presented sufficient evidence to 
show both Gomez’s knowledge and intent to control the methamphetamine found during 
the police investigation.  Gomez’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to 
convict him for possession of methamphetamine is without merit.  The jury’s verdict 
finding Gomez guilty of possession of methamphetamine should be affirmed. 
 
II. 
Gomez Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In His Unpreserved Claim That The 
District Court Erred By Not Giving A Specific Unanimity Instruction 
 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Gomez asserts that the district court erred by not 
giving a specific unanimity instruction regarding his possession of methamphetamine.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.12-20.)  Gomez has failed to establish fundamental error entitling 
him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 
(2000)).  “An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.”  State v. Shackelford, 150 
                                            
3  The prosecutor also argued during her closing that the jury could convict Gomez 
based on his possession of the methamphetamine he admitted smoking the day prior to 
his arrest.  (Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.11-17.)  For the reasons set forth below (see Arg. II), 
because it involved criminal conduct separate from Gomez’s possession of 
methamphetamine at the time of his arrest, this was not a proper theory to present to 
the jury as a standalone basis for conviction absent a separate charge.  Regardless, 
that Gomez had smoked a substance he knew was methamphetamine is sufficient to 
show both his knowledge and control over that methamphetamine. 
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Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)). 
 
C. Gomez Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The District Court’s Not 
Giving An Unrequested Specific Unanimity Instruction 
 
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”  State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 
261 P.3d at 865 (“An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on 
appeal.”) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)).  This 
same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions.  See I.C.R. 30(b) (“No party 
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to 
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 
261 P.3d at 865.  Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only 
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.  Id.; see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Gomez did not request a specific unanimity instruction below.  Thus, to prevail on 
appeal, Gomez must show that omission of the unrequested instruction rises to the level 
of fundamental error.  To establish fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 





Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
Jury verdicts must be unanimous.  State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 375, 247 
P.3d 582, 602 (2010); I.C.R. 31(a).  However, “[a]n instruction that the jury must 
unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense … is generally not required.”  
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012) (quoting State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711, 215 P.3d 414, 431 (2009)).  The exception to this 
general rule is when a defendant commits different criminal acts, each of which 
constitute “separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus.”  Id. 
at 475, 272 P.3d at 447.  In other words, where there is a duplicitous charge.  See State 
v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 48, 89 P.3d 881, 888 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted) 
(“[d]uplicity refers to the charging of more than one offense in a single count of the 
charging document”). 
In this case, the state charged Gomez with possession of methamphetamine, 
alleging: 
That the defendant, ANDREW SCOTT GOMEZ, on or about the 
27th day of April, 2015, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully 
possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II 
controlled substance. 
 
(R., p.24.)  There is no duplicity in the charge itself, and Gomez would be entitled to no 
specific unanimity instruction on that basis.  However, as noted by Gomez (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.14-15), during closing statements the prosecutor argued that the jury could 
convict Gomez of possession on three separate theories: first, based on Gomez’s 
admission “that he smoked methamphetamine earlier” (Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.11-17); 
second, based on his transporting his co-defendant and her drugs in exchange for a 
portion of those drugs (id., p.219, L.18 – p.220, L.3); and third, based on his actual 
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possession of a pipe containing methamphetamine residue (id., p.220, Ls.4-25).  Each 
theory will be addressed below. 
 
1. Both Gomez’s Possession Of The Methamphetamine Residue Found On 
His Pipe And The Baggies Of Methamphetamine He Was Transporting 
With His Co-Defendant Were Part Of The Same Criminal Incident 
 
On appeal Gomez argues, inter alia, that possessing both methamphetamine 
residue on his pipe and the baggies of crystal methamphetamine he was transporting 
with his co-defendant constitutes separate acts of possession of methamphetamine.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16.)  It does not.   
This issue is controlled by the Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Southwick, 
158 Idaho 173, 345 P.3d 232 (2014).  In that case, the state alleged that Southwick 
possessed methamphetamine, and presented alternative theories to the jury that she 
constructively possessed crystals found in baggies in the passenger compartment, 
and/or residue found on paraphernalia, i.e., a digital scale.  Id. at 182, 345 P.3d at 241.  
The Court determined that these theories constituted alternative factual means by which 
the element of possession could be proved, not independent crimes.  Id.  The 
possession happened at the same time, in the same location, as part of the same 
criminal incident.  Id.  The record did not indicate “a distinct union of mens rea and actus 
reus separated by a discrete period of time or circumstance for the two alleged acts of 
possession.”  Id.  Therefore, that Southwick had possessed the methamphetamine in 
two specific locations did not indicate two separate crimes.  Id. 
In this case, the state charged Gomez with possession of methamphetamine 
without alleging a specific factual theory underlying that possession.  (See R., pp.23-
24.)  At trial, the state presented alternative theories that Gomez committed that crime 
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by, inter alia, (1) constructively possessing methamphetamine residue in the baggies 
found on his passenger and around the passenger compartment, and/or (2) by actually 
possessing the methamphetamine residue found on his paraphernalia, i.e., a meth pipe.  
(See Trial Tr., p.218, L.17 – p.221, L.9.)  As in Southwick, both of these theories arose 
from the same criminal incident.  The specific location where Gomez possessed his 
drugs, whether in his glove compartment, in the trunk of his vehicle, in his hip pocket, or 
anywhere else in the car is irrelevant.  That he possessed both baggies of crystal 
methamphetamine and methamphetamine residue on his pipe constitutes the crime of 
possessing a controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine; it does not constitute 
multiple criminal acts of possession.4   
Even had Gomez requested a specific unanimity instruction for the prosecutor’s 
alternative theories that Gomez possessed methamphetamine by actually possessing 
the residue-containing pipe and/or by constructively possessing the drugs he was 
transporting with this co-defendant, he would not have been entitled to one.  Gomez has 
failed to show error in the district court’s omitting an instruction to which he was not 
entitled.  He has therefore failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of this 
unpreserved claim of error. 
 
2. Gomez’s Possession Of Methamphetamine, Based On His Smoking 
Methamphetamine Earlier, Arose From A Separate Criminal Incident 
 
Gomez was not entitled to a specific unanimity instruction where both the 
methamphetamine residue and crystals were discovered during the investigation of the 
                                            
4  This is especially true in drug cases where criminal penalties are graded to the total 
weight of the illegal substance, not the number of packages containing the substance.  
See I.C. § 37-2732B. 
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same criminal incident.  However, the state agrees that the methamphetamine Gomez 
admitted consuming earlier in the day was not part of that same incident.  By telling the 
jurors that they could convict Gomez on the standalone theory that he had possessed 
methamphetamine when consuming it earlier, in an incident apparently unrelated to the 
investigation of the vehicle, the prosecutor introduced duplicity into the charge.  In that 
circumstance, the giving of a specific unanimity instruction would have been among the 
severable possible remedies available to cure the error. 
Gomez, however, cannot show that the error of which he complains (the lack of a 
specific unanimity instruction) was clear—in the sense that defense counsel’s failure to 
request a specific unanimity instruction was not a tactical decision.  Because the 
prosecutor injected some error into the proceedings, Gomez was entitled to some 
remedy.  But rather than request a specific unanimity instruction, allowing the jury to 
convict his client of possession on either the theory that he used methamphetamine 
earlier (which he admitted) or on the theory that he possessed methamphetamine at the 
time he was seized in his vehicle (for which there was overwhelming evidence), defense 
counsel chose instead to take the “use” theory off the table.  At the beginning of his 
closing argument, counsel explained to the jury: 
Now, there is no question that Andrew Gomez was a user of 
methamphetamine.  In fact, again as Ms. Wager pointed out per his own 
admission they had smoked a bowl earlier in the evening.  He was a user.  
No question. 
 
In getting back to the elements again.  Was he knowingly in 
possession of methamphetamine when he smoked that bowl?  Of course.  





The problem is he is not being charged with being a user.  And he 
is not being charged with what he did earlier in the evening.  He is being 
charged with knowingly and [sic] possessing methamphetamine at the 
time of his arrest when they show up at the scene at the car. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.223, L.16 – p.224, L.6.)  Defense counsel made the tactical decision to cure 
the error, not by requesting a specific unanimity instruction which would have kept the 
“use” theory on the table, but by removing that theory altogether. 
Gomez has also failed to carry his burden of showing that the error prejudiced 
him.  First, as shown above, the weight of evidence establishing that Gomez possessed 
methamphetamine under the proper theories of this case was overwhelming.  (See Arg. 
I, supra.) 
Moreover, in a proper closing argument, evidence that Gomez had used his pipe 
to smoke methamphetamine earlier would have still played a key role because Gomez’s 
use of the pipe to consume methamphetamine established his guilt on both of his 
charges:  That he earlier used the pipe to smoke methamphetamine showed that he 
knew the residue in the pipe was methamphetamine, which proved his actual 
possession of the methamphetamine residue.  That he actually used the pipe to smoke 
methamphetamine also demonstrated that he intended to use the pipe to consume a 
controlled substance, thus establishing possession of paraphernalia.   
The prosecutor’s assertion that the jury could convict Gomez of possessing 
methamphetamine based directly on his admission to having used his pipe to smoke the 
drugs earlier in the day was erroneous.  But considering the way in which defense 
counsel properly sought to cure that error during closing argument; in addition to the 
weight of evidence of Gomez’s guilt based on any of the proper alternative theories; in 
addition to the central role Gomez’s use of the pipe to smoke methamphetamine earlier 
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in the day would play in any closing argument, Gomez is not able to show that the 
outcome of his trial would have been any different had the district court given the 
(unsolicited) specific unanimity instruction.  He has therefore failed to show fundamental 
error entitling him to review of this unpreserved claim of error. 
 
III. 
Gomez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting 
Evidence That Gomez Was Transporting A Backpack Filled With Marijuana 
 
A. Introduction 
Gomez challenges the district court’s evidentiary ruling admitting evidence of the 
marijuana discovered in the backpack Gomez was transporting, along with all of the 
methamphetamine, with his co-defendant.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.21-26.)  Gomez argues 
that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as propensity evidence, asserting 
that the state failed to provide a sufficient offer of proof to show a proper basis for 
admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b).  (Id.) 
Gomez’s argument, whatever its merits, is irrelevant.  While it is true that the 
state sought admission of the marijuana evidence under Rule 404(b) (see R., pp.78-79), 
that was not the basis on which the district court granted admission.  Rather, it admitted 
the evidence because it was res gestae.  (See Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.11-20.)  Gomez has 
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that 
Gomez was also transporting a backpack of marijuana. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009) 
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(citations omitted).  “In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will 
grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”  
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
 
C. Under The Circumstances Of This Case, Evidence That Gomez Was 
Transporting Marijuana With His Co-Defendant Was Part Of The Entire Picture 
Of Gomez’s Crime Of Possession Of Methamphetamine 
 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the 
person acted in conformity therewith.”  I.R.E. 404(b).  An exception to the Rule 404(b) 
prohibition of other misconduct evidence is res gestae, or the “complete story principle,” 
where “the charged act and the uncharged act are so inseparably connected that the 
jury cannot be given a rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime without 
reference to the uncharged misconduct.”  State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19, 878 
P.2d 188, 193 (Ct. App. 1994).  As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State v. Izatt, 
96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975): 
The state is entitled to present a full and accurate account of the 
circumstances of the commission of the crime, and if such an account also 
implicates the defendant or defendants in the commission of other crimes 
for which they have not been charged, the evidence is nevertheless 
admissible. The jury is entitled to base its decision upon a full and 
accurate description of the events concerning the whole criminal act, 
regardless of whether such a description also implicates a defendant in 
other criminal acts. 
 
See also McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (7th ed. 1999) (“other-crime evidence should 
be admissible to complete the story…when the material in question is necessary to a 
 
18 
fair understanding of the behavior of the individuals involved in the criminal enterprise or 
the events immediately leading up to them.”) (footnotes omitted).   
In this case, the district court determined that “[t]he marijuana in the trunk [was] 
admissible,” explaining: 
The issue of course is possession.  It is all part of the same act, same 
scene, and it is relevant and admissible.  And I don’t think any prejudicial 
effect outweighs its probative value.  I think it is part of the entire picture in 
this case.  It is relevant to the issues brought before the jury. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.15-20.)  The district court was correct.  In exchange for some portion 
of the methamphetamine, Gomez agreed to transport his co-defendant and her drugs.  
(Id., p.146, Ls.7-18.)  Part of those drugs was a backpack filled with marijuana that 
Gomez and his co-defendant picked up en route.  (Id., p.147, L.7 – p.148, L.10.)  The 
marijuana was therefore res gestae, or, as the district court articulated it, “part of the 
entire picture in this case.” 
Gomez does not challenge the district court’s actual ruling below, instead arguing 
that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b).  (Appellant’s brief, pp.21-26.)  
But (as noted above) res gestae is an exception to Rule 404(b).  See Blackstead, 126 
Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 193.  Because Gomez has failed to challenge the actual basis 
for the district court’s evidentiary ruling, this Court should affirm the district court on that 
unchallenged basis.  See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 1311, 
1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Even had the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the 
marijuana, such error would have been harmless.  An erroneous evidentiary ruling is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the verdict.  State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010).  The jury did not find Gomez 
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guilty of possession of methamphetamine because he was also transporting a backpack 
of marijuana.  The jury found him guilty of possessing methamphetamine because, as 
shown above (Argument I, supra), there was overwhelming evidence that Gomez was 
guilty of possession of methamphetamine.  Evidence that Gomez was also transporting 
marijuana with his co-defendant would not have affected the outcome of this trial and, 
therefore, even if erroneous, admission of evidence regarding the marijuana was 
necessarily harmless. 
The district court correctly admitted evidence that Gomez was transporting, along 
with the methamphetamine, marijuana with his co-defendant because it was res gestae.  
Gomez has failed to challenge the actual basis for the district court’s evidentiary ruling 
and it should therefore be affirmed on that unchallenged basis.  Even if the district court 
admitted the evidence erroneously, such error was necessarily harmless.  The judgment 
of the district court should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Gomez’s conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. 
 DATED this 9th day of November, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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